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Political Push Factors in Emigration:
AComparative Analysis
Rebecca Nielsen
or the last several decades the "brain drain" has
remained an unresolved issue in the field of political
development. Despite a large body of research
devoted to the topic, most work is theoretical rather than
observational. The few systematic studies of migration
have been limited to specific times and settings, and the
collective results do not fall into any generalized pattern.
This paper is intended to be a comparative study of "push
factors" to show why people migrate, and particularly
why people of different educational backgrounds migrate
at different rates. While many previous arguments about
migration assume that developing states are entirely at the
mercy of arbitrary and impersonal economic tides; I show
that governments might be able regulate migration, at least
partially, through political and social policies.

F

are the largest factor driving masses of educated people
to advanced industrialized states. While individuals with
professional training (in medicine, law, engineering, etc.)
may be in high demand in their native country, they can earn
far more competitive wages in a wealthier region. 4 Hence,
when the government of a less-developed nation invests in
educating its citizens, it is likely to suffcr a net loss; rather
than staying and contributing to society, graduates have
strong incentives to leave the country as soon as they secure
a degree or diploma, often without compensating for their
government-subsidized education. 5
The purpose of this paper is to build on existing studies by measuring brain drain effects using a large number
sample that allows for conclusions more broadly applicable
than those that could be reached with a case study.

Introduction
There is a general consensus that improved and
increased education is vital to achieving state development
and some scholars go further; Amartya Sen 1 argues that
education is a form of development because it affords
people greater choices and capabilities. Additional studies
suggest that accumulating human capital, such as a well
educated population, may lay the foundation for rapid
economic development." Frequently cited examples
include the Japan and Taiwan. 3 A large body of evidenceanecdotal or qualitative--on north-south relations indicates
that developing countries are falling victim to a brain
drain, their most brilliant minds are drawn off to more
prosperous and progressive nations in the developed
"north." This suggests that governments' efforts to educate
their citizens may prove futile. While there is a good deal
of disagreement over the precise causes of the brain drain,
most scholars concur that asymmetric economic incentives

The Brain Drain in literature
The largest body of literature on brain drain portrays
it as a dire setback in Third- World development that can
only be solved with tremendous cooperation and effort on
the parts of both north and south. Dependency theorists
argue that by setting high educational requirements for
immigrants, governments with developed economies
exacerbate the drain on the developing world by
filtering out the undereducated and welcoming trained
professionals; thus, realizing a "brain gain" at the
expense of the source nation.I' Some go so far as to claim
that developed countries are deliberately exploiting
developing countries by "skimming off' the most skilled
and intelligent foreign laborers.7 The ideal solution, these
scholars contend, is for developed nations to reform
their immoral apathy toward Third World troubles and to
adequately compensate source countries for each skilled
worker they lose. H
23
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However, since the first articulation of the brain drain
effect in the mid-twentieth century, the urgent sense that the
drain must be "plugged" has diminished in the academic
community; in fact, many development scholars have begun
to view a brain drain as potentially beneficial for source
states in the developing world. Proponents of the "diaspora
theory" believe that migration to the north has the potential
to secure net monetary gains for the developing source
states through direct remittances and donations as well as
by opening new channels for the flow of information. 9 ill
advanced countries, economies of scale and the availability
of superior technology allow educated migrants to be more
effective and productive than they could possibly be in their
native region. 11l In their improved economic circumstances,
migrants can better aid those left behind by sending back
remittances, offering expert advice, and helping to start
businesses, as Kwabena O. Akurang-Parryll demonstrates
in a case study of Ghanian expatriates. Andrew Mountford I 2
calculates that an alleged brain drain may, under the right
conditions, actually lead to a rise in educational attainment
in the source country. He argues that if people perceive high
economic returns on emigration, and educated people are
most capable of migrating, then more people will enroll
in school. In the I 960s, Turkey and Jordan followed a
minimally successful "3 R" agenda based on diaspora
theory: recruitment of citizens to migrate abroad, collection
of remittances, and eventually the return of these workers,
with skills added. 13 While several recent case studies
have affirmed that remittances do increase educational
attainment in the source country,14 David McKenzie and
Hillel Rappoportl5 show that Mexican children are less
educated in families with migrant members.
If the pull of wealthier nations is the only significant
factor behind migration and the most pessimistic brain
drain theorists are right, then the outlook for developing
countries is bleak. Migration forms a vicious circle: citizens leave because the country is relatively poor, thereby
depriving it of human capital, a shortage which in tum
impedes even the best development efforts by the government. Without development, the state remains poor.
If states try to limit emigration by force, they will encounter not only logistical but ethical dilemmas: emigration (though not necessarily immigration) is commonly
considered a human right; the ability of people to "vote
with their feet."16 Advanced industrialized countries, on
the other hand, seek to exercise strict control over immigration by using educational standards to regulate legal
migration so that only the most qualified applicants may
enter. Such limited migration represents a beneficial gain
of skilled workers for whom the host country is spared the
costs of training; thus, these countries have little incentive
to change the status quo. This situation seems inevitable
unless there are other, more dynamic elements that can
mitigate a brain drain-that is, factors that the source gov24

ernment can adjust or alter to some degree. If such factors
exist, then perhaps developing states can control the extent of their migration without depending on unlikely and
unreliable cooperation of others.
Brain drain case studies often examine "push and
pull factors" to determine the motives of individuals that
migrate between nations. Pull factors are characteristics
of the host country that attract immigrants; for example,
a strong, stable economy, high wages or job availability.
Conversely,pushfactors are features of the source country
that explain why inhabitants would seek to emigrate,
including low-average income, war, or high rates of
disease. This paper assumes that in general all developing
countries face similar pull factors from the world at large;
thus, its focus is primarily on push factors and the degree
to which they determine the likelihood of migration.
While economic disparities might be the most significant push factors behind migration for all education
levels, data collected by Frederic Docquier and Abdeslam
Marfouk l7 show that variously educated groups migrate
at rates that differ significantly not only from each other
but from the overall migration rates in each country. As
brain drain theorists predict, people appear most likely to
migrate with at least a secondary education. The highly
educated tertiary groups are theoretically the most capable
of moving-and often gain the most from it monetarily.
The available data generally supports this fact, although
in several cases migration rates among the population with
only secondary school attainment outstrips that of both
the most and least educated sectors. For example, in Laos
in 2000, the migration rate among residents with tertiary
educations was 13.8 percent; among those with secondary educations this figure rose to 20.9 percent, while the
overall migration rate was a mere 7.1 percent. There is
also significant variation in the overall rates from country
to country, ranging from 44 percent in Tonga to virtually
none in Lesotho.
Why do these rates fluctuate from country to country,
and from group to group? I conclude that there are factors
in addition to education level and economic incentives
that dictate these irregularities in migration. Certain of
these factors must have a larger impact for one particular
educational group than for the others, and the total
distribution of these factors in a country should explain
higher or lower emigration rates relative to other nations:
hence, the comparative nature of this study. If there are
indeed other factors governing migration apart from pure
economic gain, then perhaps governments may indirectly
regulate emigration by adjusting those factors as they see
fit. Procedures to reduce emigration could be implemented
when soaring rates are harming the source country; reverse
policies (intended to encourage migration) could possibly
alleviate unemployment pressures or promote the creation
of a beneficial diaspora.
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Theory and Hypotheses
In line with the bulk of brain drain theorists, I
expect that overall economic indicators will have the
largest influence on each sector of the population.
Representative of many economic arguments is that of
Harry Johnson,ls who explains migration as the result
of rational cost-benefit analyses by individuals. Trained
professionals naturally flow to the areas where they are
in most demand-that is, where people will pay the most
for their services. If a skilled laborer calculates that he
or she will make much more per year after migration
and that migration outweighs the expenses of travel and
resettlement, then they will go abroad. I hypothesize that
nations with lower, average incomes will tend to generate
more migration to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)19 countries at a fairly
constant rate across educational groups. While educated
people are likely to receive relatively higher wages even
in a low-income country (and are therefore more capable
of a costly undertaking like migration) educated people
also tend to create positive externalities in developing
countries. As Johnson 20 notes, people often appreciate
the positive externalities they provide and will factor that
loss into the mental calculus of any migration decision,
resulting in a tempering of migration among educated
groups. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
1. Increased incomes reduce incentives fa emigratejor all
education groups.
One of the more controversial theoretical debates in
migration studies concerns the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border migration.
In the context ofthe Heckscher-Ohlin model, FDI appears
to strike at the root causes of migration by creating businesses, increasing employment and reducing the inequality between domestic and foreign wage rates. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development asserted
in 1996 that FDI
contributes directly to a reduction of migration through
job creation in foreign affiliates and ... contributes to
economic development by bringing technology and
organizational and managerial know-how and providing origin countries access to markets. FDI can thus
generate a sense of hope among potential migrants for
a better economic future in countries with insufficient
capital but abundant labour. 21
A study by Patricio Aroca and W.F. Mal oney22 affirmed
that FDI flows into Mexico from the U.S. had dampened
illegal migration. However, at the same time that FDI
alleviates outward pressure, it lifts constraints (such as
extreme poverty) that may have previously impeded
movement. Moreover, FDI generates opportunities for
migration by strengthening ties and business networking
between the north and developing countries and, in this

sense, FDI may be a complement, rather than a substitute,
for migration. To illustrate one instance of this, Phillip
Martin 23 cites the example of export processing zones
(EPZs) on state borders where FDI is often concentrated,
such as the maquiladoras along the Mexican-U.S. border.
These factories attract thousands of workers, and the
surplus tends to trickle over illegally into the U.S.

2. Foreign direct investment influences decisions to migrate but it is unclear whether this impact will be positive
or negative.
In addition to the economic situation, I posit that
the political environment of a country has a measurable
effect on migration, and that political dissatisfaction
will promote migration. A study of migration from
Bangladesh to India attributes the movement partly to
"political instability, fear of riots and terrorism," as well
as an "absence of democratic rights" in Bangladesh
which was driving ethnic strife between Muslims and
Hindus. 24 According to Pranati Datta the economic
depression in Bangladesh was the most decisive factor
in emigration but 65 percent of respondents claimed that
bad governance was one of the contributing issues. I
anticipate that the impact of political liberties and civil
rights (or the lack thereof) will be greater among the more
highly educated strata. University graduates, especially
those who study abroad in developed countries, will be
much more sensitive to the performance shortfalls of
their own governments and likely to become fmstrated
if a government suppresses discussion or ignores their
input. Educated people are also more predisposed to
engage in activities that governments will dislike or
interfere with, such as arranging demonstrations, writing
provocative articles, starting up businesses, or mnning
unofficial civil associations.
Given this trend, autocratic regimes are inclined to
distmst the more educated echelons of society because
they recognize that these people are influential and when
dissatisfied the educated strata may orchestrate subversive
activities. Thus, the intellectual elite will be a particular
target for violence and repression, as in the "Great Purge"
under Stalin or Saddam Hussein's Iraq, where purportedly
more than five hundred journalists were murdered by
the government. 25 Furthermore, in the face of political
uncertainty or current, bad policies with the potential lead
to revolt, repression, or violence in the future, educated
workers with relatively high incomes are most able of
removing themselves and their families from the region
before these events occur. However, the relationship
between political freedom and migration may function
on a curve: while I predict that the most liberal societies
will be fairly static, totalitarian mlers like Kim Jong II of
North Korea may try to isolate the country by imposing
interdictions on migration to keep citizens from fleeing
oppression or recmiting help from the outside world; thus,
25
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the absence of migration is not necessarily indicative of a
political paradise.
4. Governments that are unresponsive or deny civil and political freedoms to citi=ens will see increased emigration,
especially among the secondary and tertiary education
groups, except in extreme cases where an authoritarian
government locks the borders.
In a similar vein, high levels of violence or breakdowns in the rule of law should fuel migration rates
across all groups as the educated and non-educated alike
flee to escape. Educated people, on average the wealthiest, may be in the best position to put distance between
them and the violence, but civil unrest tends to target the
rich and educated first. In civil wars, enemies try to remove each other's assets, including human capital such
as professional doctors, politicians, and business owners.
In post-invasion Iraq, where universities are plagued by
looting and terrorist attacks, over two hundred professors have been killed since 2004. 26 In sudden outbursts
of hostility, many educated people may not have time to
flee the country before being stripped of their property
or killed.
5. Violence and the threat of physical harm will induce
migration across all educational levels.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)27
devotes an entire chapter of a recent publication on world
migration to the issue of AIDS. The HIVIAIDS illness is
particularly prevalent in developing countries where it
kills off workers in their prime, resulting in orphaned dependents and workforces too young, small, and inexperienced to fill labor demands. IfMartin 2R is right in claiming
that scarcity of jobs is a push factor in migration, then the
spread ofHlV/AIDS ought to reduce migration. However,
AIDS might contribute to migration as infected individuals seek advanced treatment in developing countries; the
10M believes it might, noting that death rates for adults
with HIV are about twenty times higher for lower-income
countries than industrialized states.
In countries where the risk of disease is very high and
medical resources are limited, educated people will move
to keep themselves and their children from becoming
victims. If a person is already infected but cannot access
the necessary treatments in their home country, they will
try to move to an advanced country where their sickness
can be dealt with. Less educated people are not as likely as
others to move based on health needs. They may not realize
that they are sick or that their illnesses can be treated, and
even if they do they are more likely than educated people
to seek folk remedies or blame the disease on superstitious
causes like witchcraft. If they are poor or live in isolated
rural areas they will often accept death and disease as part
of life because they cannot afford to migrate and then pay
for treatment.
26

6. High levels ofdisease and low access to healthcare will
increase migrationfor the tertiary education group.
Finally, I hypothesize that a certain social "herd
behavior" is evident in migration patterns. When Kez
Miyagiwa29 discusses how economies of scale work
into the brain drain he is primarily interested with the
professional effectiveness of educated workers in various
more or less advanced environments. However, Miyagiwa
also suggests that educated people enjoy the company of
their peers; they like to be able to discuss and share ideas
and collaborate with equals. Ifpeople feel they have others
with similar interests with which to associate and form
friendships or mutually beneficial relationships, they will
be less inclined to leave for a foreign country where they
do not know anybody. On the other hand, if there is not a
solid base of academic institutions and networks (research
groups or scholarly magazines, for instance) or at least a
critical mass of educated people remaining in a country,
then the educated population will continue to leave.
By extension, if educational opportunities in a
developing country are very low, students hoping to
advance their education will not be satisfied to stay
put-many will go abroad to finish their education, and
while abroad they are likely to form personal connections
that bind them more to the host country than their native
home. Anthony Barclay,") in an overview of the brain
drain with regards to the University of Liberia, argues
that many emigrants leave, not so much out of a desire to
maximize profits, but out of a desire to learn. Third World
universities are crowded, under-equipped, poorly staffed,
and targeted by repressive regimes; students realize that
for an effective education they need to study abroad. Once
they establish themselves overseas they find that they are
better respected or that their skills are more effective in
their adopted country. Thus the drain perpetuates itself
because the professionals left behind to teach the next
generation have mediocre training and lack access to new
ideas and methods. In order for levels of social capital to
be maintained in the home country, the government must
provide adequate educational resources. Lindsay LowelP!
proposes policies to help governments retain university
students, such as offering scholarships conditional
upon staying in the country, allowing larger budgets for
schooling, and exonerating loans for graduates who enter
the national workforce.
7. A higher concentration of educated people will tend to
decrease emigrationfor the tertiary and secondary education groups.
8. Government investment in education should serve to
reduce migration abroad.

Data

Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates
Empirical studies of the brain drain, its causes and its
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effects, have been lacking due to a deficit of data about
migration worldwide. While countries tend to regulate
immigrants as they enter the country, many-with the
exception of the most repressive or totalitarian regimes,
like North Korea and China-are relatively less concerned
about monitoring who leaves. Migrants are often subject
to quotas and required to meet educational requirements
or various other criteria upon entering a new country, but
many host nations (particularly those outside of the OECD)
do not compile comprehensive records of the country of
origin, age, skill level, or profession of those who are
approved for admission. Moreover, some migrants may
bypass legal processes by slipping through unpatrolled
borders. The OECD itself makes an etfort to track
and publish data about immigration stocks in member
countries, but these data are not specifically broken down
by both the source country and educational attainment
and are, therefore, inadequate to calculate emigration
stocks with regard to educational qualifications.
Without statistics for emigration rates, the purported
brain drain from developing countries is virtually impossible to quantitY. In one of the first and few attempts to
do so on a large scale, William J. Carrington and Enrica
Detragiache 32 compiled somewhat flawed estimates that
merely identified which regions were experiencing the
greatest "drain." They derived their statistical model for
the brain drain by determining the skill structure for each
country of origin among U.S. immigrants and then projecting those proportions on the entire OECD migrant stock.
However, this method fails to control for a number of factors, not the least of which is the inconsistent skill makeup
of immigrant profiles across OECD countries. So far, little
quantitative, non-theoretical research has tested for effective political strategies to control the drain or for the direct
effects of migration on development, with the exception of
Michel Beine et al. 33 who used Carrington and Detragiache's estimates to predict the consequences of the brain
drain for economic growth. A working paper by Richard
H. Adams 34 also uses methods similar to Carrington and
Detragiache to determine the effects of remittances on
labor-exporting countries.
The estimates provided by Docquier and Marfouk35 improve on the Carrington and Detragiache model in a number
of ways, although the work is preliminary. Docquier and
Marfouk use census information from twenty-five OECD
countries (covering 92 percent of OECD migrant stocks)
and account for the educational attainment of migrants
for each country individually. From this they calculate the
yearly rates of emigration trom 190 countries (for 1990 and
2000). It is important to note that in this study, emigration
rate refers to the percentage of a given country's native labor force that is living outside of the country, not necessarily the percentage that leaves in that year. Docquier and
Marfouk determine the overall emigration rates and the

rates for three skillleducationallevels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary refers to those with zero to
eight"years of schooling, secondary to those with nine
to twelve years, and tertiary to those with thirteen or
more. The three rates are referred to in my regressions respectively as Primary Emigration, Secondary Emigration,
and Tertiary Emigration. I also test my independent variables against the total emigration rates for each country.
While the Docquier-Marfouk model is the most recent
and accurate model of world emigration, it has several
drawbacks that may distort or obscure the outcome of my
tests. First, for OECD states where information on the age or
educational structure of migrants was lacking, Docquier and
Marfouk were forced to extrapolate from the composition
of migrant populations in other OECD countries. Since
educational attainment statistics are generally unavailable
for illegal migrants, they assume that most illegal migrants
fall into one of the lesser educated groups.
Second, the emigration database includes only migrants over age twenty-five (in order to facilitate crossanalysis with the Barro-Lee education database) but does
not account for the age and educational level at which immigrants entered the country, or how long they have lived
there. This makes it impossible to differentiate between
migrants who were educated before, as opposed to after
they were "drained," which is an important distinction for
many brain drain analysts. George J. Sefa Dei and Alireza
Azgharzadeh show that the brain drain can happen in two
nonsequential "phases:" in the first phase, individuals migrate after receiving an education in their native country;
in the second, individuals travel abroad to receive education and then fail to return. The former phase is implicitly
more damaging to a developing country because education is expensive and often highly subsidized within the
source state. 36 The Docquier-Marfouk database will give
an identical classification to an individual who migrated
as an infant and spends their entire educational experience
in an OECD country as to someone who migrates as a
twenty-eight-year-old medical doctor. Likewise, as the authors point out, there is also no way to control for graduate
students who are studying abroad temporarily, although
the twenty-five-year-old cut off will filter out many of
these cases.
Third, this data only captures migration from
developed or developing nations to OECD nations, which
encompasses roughly about 60 percent of total world
migration. The other 40 percent usually occurs as citizens of
developing nations move to relatively progressive nations
that still fall in the Third World category; South Africa,
Singapore, and the Gulf States are popular destinations.
Moreover, migrants from the poorest countries may not
be able to move far to escape interstate violence and
civil wars-if Docquier and Marfouk were to compile
similar data for 2006 they would not capture the massive
27
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inflows of Iraqi refugees to neighboring Syria and Jordan.
However, Docquier and Marfouk are confident that their
data captures at least 85 percent of the world's most
educated migrants; thus, the tertiary estimates may be the
most precise reflection of actual migration decisions.
Independent Variables
To measure income I use gross national income
(GNI) per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) in current international dollars, as obtained from the year 2000
World Development Indicators provided by the World
Bank. 37 This figure is the sum of all goods and services
produced in the country in a given year, divided by the
population and adjusted for the actual purchasing power
of that amount. Because GNI tends to have a logilinear
form I used the log of GNI in my regressions. Unfortunately, while GNI per capita may represent an average
income, it does not account for the distribution or spread
of income-in other words, the income gap. This may be
particularly pronounced in states were the government or
concentrated group owns a natural rent (like oil or beachside real estate) that does not directly profit the people at
large. However, including measures of inequality, such as,
the Gini coefficient, would severely limit my sample size.
So, using GNI by itself is practical compromise.
Figures for inward FDI flows in 2000 are available
from the United Nations Foreign Direct Investment
Database 38 and are quantified in U.S. dollars at current
prices in millions. Martin 39 warns that FDI may take years
to affect migration behaviors, but here I assume that FDI in
the year 2000 will be somewhat indicative of the amount
ofFDI in previous years.
To measure the quality of governance and political
liberty I used the Polity 2 variable from the Polity IV
Project database produced by the Center for International
Development and Conflict Management. 40 This variable
ranges from negative ten (strongly autocratic) to positive
ten (strongly democratic) and represents the difference
between the democracy and autocracy scores assigned to
each state by the Polity IV Project. These scores are coded
based on the presence of electoral institutions, the degree
of political competition and participation, constraints on
the executive, and so on. In my regressions this variable is
simply named Polity. To control for cases where autocratic
governments unduly restrict emigration, I use the freedom
of movement dummy variable from the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. 41 A value of zero
for the Movement variable represents a government that in
some way restricts the movement of its citizens.
Likewise, I gauge levels of violence using the CIRI
index for physical integrity which encompasses measures
of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. This scale ranges from zero to nine
with higher values indicating less frequent incidents of
violence and greater respect for physical integrity.
28

Data on the spread of HIV has relatively good
coverage in comparison with most other health indicators,
which makes it advantageous over other possibilities for
operationalizing health. I obtained the prevalence of HIV
from the 2000 World Bank Development Indicators where
it is expressed as the infection rate for people ages fifteen
to forty-nine as a percent of total population.
I use government spending on education as a rough
measure of the educational opportunities in a country and
of the relative quality of that education. I assume that higher
government expenditures on a particular level of education
correlates either with the provision of educational programs,
faculty, textbooks, and scholarships to a wider sector of the
population, or with the attainment of better educational
standards by those that are educated. The variable Education Spending does not represent gross spending but rather
the percentage of total government spending allocated to
education as reported by the United Nations Human Development Report.42
Social capital is difficult to quantify and consequently the methods I use to account for it are imprecise.
The variable Youth Bulge is based on a scale created by
the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy43 which converts the popUlation age zero to fourteen as a percent of
the total population into a nine-point scale, where one
signifies a low growth rate and nine signifies a high
growth rate. This captures demographic stress-population pressures which may increase emigration, especially
as laborers move to support their families and ensure better education for their children. I use this variable cautiously due to its fairly high correlation with a number of
other control variables, such as, GNI Log, Polity, HIV,
and Physical Integrity (see Appendix, Table 6). Second,
I use the various migration rates as determinants of each
other: this serves as an imperfect measure of the educational composition of each state and the "herd behavior"
that I expect to see in migration patterns. In using this
approach, I must acknowledge the possibility that any
relationship between the emigration rates could be spurious; in other words, third party variables might cause the
change in both the dependent and independent emigration
rates. The correlation between Tertiary Emigration and
Secondary Emigration, as well as that between Secondary
Emigration and Primary is high. However, the correlation
between Tertiary Emigration and Primary Emigration is
comparatively low at 0.28 (see Appendix, Table 6).

Methods
I test all of my independent variables against my four
dependent variables using an Ordinary Least Squares (0 LS)
regression for a sample of 105 countries. A regression
will demonstrate what extent my variables explain the
migration rate and reveal which independent variables are
most important in determining each dependent variable.
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Results
I first tested all of my determinants against the total
emigration rates for each country (see Table 1). Model 1
confirms that a GNI per capita is negatively correlated with
migration. Contrary to my predictions, however, emigration
actually appears to increase with polity scores and decrease
with the prevalence of HIV, though only slightly in
either case (for instance, a 5 percent difference in HIV
corresponds with only a I percent change in emigration,
given the first model). Model 2 demonstrates that in the
absence of a variable to control for the youth bulge GNI
loses significance; potential migrants with the same income
may make different decisions based on the varying rate of
population growth. This second regression also suggests
that lower levels of violence facilitate emigration.
Table 2 shows the effect of these same variables on
the rate of emigration among people with the lowest levels
of education. It is interesting to note that a youth bulge
seems associated with diminished rates of emigration;
thus. as a population increases more quickly, people in
this group migrate slightly less. This may be a result of
a higher dependency ratio which cuts deeply into the
salaries ofthose less-skilled workers who might otherwise
be eager and able to migrate. In the second model, FDI
has a negative, but substantially inconsequential effect on
emigration; the most significant determinants are Physical
Integrity, HIV. and Polity. Once again, the results contradict
my prediction that improvements in democracy and the
rule of law will alleviate outward migration pressures and
HIV continues to be associated with attenuation in the
emigration rate.
For potential migrants with secondary educations
my hypothesized variables have little explanatory power.
although Polity, HIV. and GNI Log maintain significance
(see Table 3). Education spending appears to reduce
emigration, but not to a large degree. As a government
increases the percentage of its total budget spent on education from 20 percent to 25 percent, this will depress
emigration for the secondary group by about 0.4 percentage points.
For emigrants with a tertiary education (see Table 4),
GNI per capita and HIV are the single largest determinants
of emigration; a comparison with Model I in Table 2 will
show that GNI is much more important for tertiary level
emigration than for the primary level. As in the previous
tests, higher GNI is associated with lower rates of
emigration, but migration is also dampened by HIV, such
that if HIV prevalence rose from 5 percent to 10 percent in
a population, we would expect nearly a 3 percent decrease
in emigrants. The dampening effect of HIV on migration
is slightly more for the tertiary education level than the
primary or secondary levels.
Rates for emigrants with tertiary educations can be
better explained with the introduction of the other migration

Table 1. Regression of Hypothesized Determinants on Total
Emigration Rates
Modell:
TOTAL
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.727**
(0.35)

-0.506
(0.31)

-0.00000459
(0.0000061)

-0.00000708
(0.0000060)

0.206***
(0.068)

0.236***
(0.064)

MOVEMENT

-0.485
(0.74)

-0.578
(0.72)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

0.293
(0.22)

0.435**
(0.19)

-0.216***
(0.059)

-0.255***
(0.052)

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

HIV
YOUTH BULGE

-0.287
(0.21)

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.035
(0.021)

-0.038*
(0.D21)

Constant

22.45**
(9.55)

15.03*
(7.96)

105
0.24

\05
0.23

Observations
R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<o.05, * p<o.l

Table 2. De endent Variable: Emi ration Rates for Primar Education

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

Modell:
PRIMARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.446*
(0.25)

-0.079
(0.21)

-0.00000758
(0.0000048)

-0.0000117**
(0.0000048)

0.134**
(0.059)

0.185***
(0.056)

-0.969
(0.86)

(0.83)

0.297*
(0.17)

0.533***
(0.16)

HIV

-0.107***
(0.036)

-0.173***
(0.037)

YOUTH BULGE

-0.478***
(0.16)

MOVEMENT
PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-1.13

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.012
(0.020)

-0.017***
(0.020)

COllstallt

15.31**
(7.13)

2.94
(5.30)

105
0.32

105
0.27

Observations
R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<O.05, * p<O.l
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for
Secondary Education
Modell:
SECONDARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

-0.700
(0.43)

-1.161**
(0.46)

-0.00000883
(0.0000075)

-0.00000362
(0.0000071 )

0.310***
(0.11)

0.246**
(0.10)

MOVEMENT

0.554
(1.25)

0.751
( 1.40)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

0.336
(0.33)

0.0395
(0.29)

-0.427***
(0.13)

-0.345***
(0.087)

Variable
GNILOG
FDIINFLOW
POLITY

HIV

YOUTH BULGE

0.601
(0.41)

EDUCATION SPENDING
COllstallt

Observations
R-squared

-0.0769**
(0.038)

-0.0704*
(0.036)

IS.44
(12.0)

34.00***
(12.1)

105
0.13

105
0.12

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<O.Ol, ** p<o.05, * p<O.l

rates as determinants. In Table 4, these rates are significant
while HIV and GNI per capita remain good predictors of
emigration. As mentioned earlier, the reliability of Model I
in Table 4 is dubious because of the high correlation between
the secondary and tertiary emigration rates. Oddly enough
in Model 2, the emigration rate for the lowest education
group seems to do a better job at predicting the tertiary rate
by itself. My social capital hypothesis held that decisions to
migrate would be most influenced by the actions of those
with the same or similar education but this regression gives
the impression that well educated workers take their cue to
migrate from the least educated members of their society.
In Model 2, controlling for the other factors, an increase of
five in the primary emigration stock corresponds with an
increase of 6.6 in the tertiary emigration stock!4 Perhaps.
if a government can decrease emigration among citizens
with primary educations, they will also reduce emigration
among those of higher education. In Model 4, FDI inflows
become significant but where the efiect was negative for
Primary Education, here the value is positive. Although FDI
is not substantively significant, this does reflect the idea that
FDI plays a dual role in both facilitating and substituting
for emigration. Similarly, where an increase in the Physical
Integrity Index correlated positively with overall and
primary level emigration, here it appears to do the opposite:
a three-point improvement cuts tertiary level emigration by
almost three percentage points.

Table 4. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for Tertiary Education
Modell:
TERTIARY
EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

GNILOG

-3.185***
(1.20)

-3.576***
(0.99)

FDIINFLOW

0.0000238
(0.000022)

0.0000282
(0.000019)

POLITY

0.201
(0.35)

0.146
(0.33)

MOVEMENT

2.59
(4.26)

2.76
(4.27)

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-0.054
(0.64)

-0.305
(0.49)

-0.536**
(0.21)

-0.465**
(0.20)

Variable

HIV

YOUTH BULGE
EDUCATION SPENDING
COllstallt

Observations
R-squared

0.509
(0.74)
-0.0248
(0.061)

-0.0549
(0.078)

89.34***
(32.S)

102.5*'*
(24.6)

105
0.19

105
0.18

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<o.Ol, ** p<O.05, * p<O.l
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Conclusions
While my results lend credence to my theory that
political and social factors do play a part in migration
decisions, it seems unlikely that countries can use political tools to effectively regulate emigration. As most governments are concerned with stemming the brain drain,
I would hesitate to derive policy prescriptions from the
outcomes presented here; the regressions in Table I would
suggest that some of the more effective ways to reduce
tertiary emigration are to decrease the accountability of
government to the voice of its citizens and intimidate or
harm the least educated members of society. However, it is
encouraging to observe that though higher Physical Integrity scores are associated with higher overall emigration,
an increase along this scale decreases emigration for the
tertiary group, thus, somewhat alleviating the brain drain.
I can confidently refute my sixth hypothesis. which
states that rising HIV rates would induce emigration.
Although HIV clearly contributes to a decrease in
emigration, one should note that it takes a moderately
large increase in infection to achieve a small reduction in
emigration. Thus, governments still lose fewer workers by
fighting the epidemic than by allowing it to escalate and
increase mortality in the working population.
The inconsistencies in my results may be due to
shortcomings in the data; as Section 4 notes, the data for
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Table 5. Dependent Variable: Emigration Rates for Tertiary Education (using primary and secondary emigration rates as determinants)

Variable

Modell:
TERTIARY
EMIGRATION

SECONDARY EMIGRATION

Model 2:
(PRIMARY
EMIGRATION only)

0.651 **
(0.33)

Model 3:
(YOUTH BULGE
excluded)

Model 4:
(PRIMARY only,
no YOUTH BULGE

0.674**
(0.30)

0.349
(0.34)

1.310-*(0.30)

0.277
(0.33)

1.162***
(0.33)

-2.573**
( 1.06)

-2.601 **
( 1.13)

-2.771 **(0.81)

-3.485***
(0.94)

0.0000322
(0.000021 )

0.0000338
(0.000021 )

0.0000340*
(0.000019)

0.0000419**
(0.000019)

-0.0482
(0.32)

0.0246
(0.33)

-0.0718
(0.30)

-0.0660
(0.32)

MOVEMENT

2.569
(4.13)

3.861
(4.23)

2.570
(4.15)

4.066
(4.31 )

PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

-0.377
(0.61)

-0.443
(0.61)

-0.483
(0.50)

-0.926**
(0.45)

HIV

-0.219
(0.22)

-0.395*
(0.20)

-0.184
(0.19)

-0.264
(0.19)

YOUTH BULGE

0.284
(0.82)

1.135
(0.69)

EDUCATION SPENDING

-0.0063
(0.069)

-0.0452
(0.0786)

-0.0027
(0.0682)

-0.0354
(0.0770)

Constant

71.98*(29.8)

69.28-*
(30.7)

78.78-**
( 19.3)

99.13***
(23.1 )

Observations

105

105

105

105

R-squarcd

0.36

0.27

0.36

0.26

PRIMARY EMIGRATION
GNI LOG
FDI INFLOW
POLITY

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1

primary and secondary education may be far less accurate
than the tertiary estimates. In addition, because this test was
run for one year rather than over a longer period of time,
some of my independent variables may not have had the
opportunity to take full effect. A time series model, had
enough data been available, might have given a clearer
picture. The greatest weakness of this study is that I am
likely to be missing one or multiple variables that are critical
to decisions to migrate (to OEeD countries). Some of these
might be difficult to quantity such as levels of nationalism
and language or geographical barriers. European countries
are situated such that they attract many more migrants from
India. Africa, and the Middle East, while large fractions
of U.S. immigration come from Mexico, South America,
the Pacific, and Asia. Proximity to a developed state makes
migration for economic reasons easier and cheaper. In
cases where political violence or civil war are push factors,
unprepared migrants are likely to move to the next state
over, not necessarily to a more economically advanced
country-thus, they are not well represented by the
Docquier-Marfouk.j, dataset. It is possible that apart from a
few common factors, there are so many different variables

affecting migration decisions that none of them will ever
become significant in a statistical analysis. Scholars tend
to draw unique conclusions from migration case studies,
so perhaps the specific interplay of motives behind each
case are different. If this is true, then quantitative methods
will do little to help us understand the brain drain or how
to control it. However, my analysis does provide a few
interesting and promising results about the varying effects
of political and social factors across education groups that
warrant further investigation. Additional research could
expand on my analysis by testing for other factors which
prompt migration or by conducting similar experiments with
more refined data on emigration as it becomes available.
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Appendix. Table 6. Correlation
TERT.
EMIG.

GNI
LOG

PRIM.
EMIG

SEC.
EMIG

FDI

MOVE.

PHYS.

SPEND.

YOUTH

HIV

TERTIARY
EMIGRATION
SECONDARY
EMIGRATION
PRIMARY
EMIGRATION
GNI LOG

0.2823

0.5624

1

-0.3617

-0.1377

0.0507

I

FOlINFLOW

-0.1262

-0.0739

0.OOS5

0.4939

1

POLITY

0.0095

O.ln5

0.3456

0.3049

0.2152

I

MOVEMENT
PHYSICAL
INTEGRITY
HIV

0.0842

0.1713

0.2192

0.142S

0.1467

0.6825

I

0.0588

0.1217

0.3806

-0.0206

0.2426

0.3504

O.39X4

I

-O.02S

-0.1574

-0.2723

-0.3407

-0.1043

-0.1465

-0.0941

-0.0868

I

0.1745

0.0063

-0.4405

-0.5905

-0.2962

-0.515

-0.3554

-0.4436

0.4696

I

-0.0581

-0.1036

-0.0629

-0.0118

-0.0308

-(l.()O99

-0.1125

-0.0532

0.0798

(U)758

YOUTH BULGE
EDUCATION
SPENDING

1
0.5060
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